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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

After the decision of the Supreme Court in the first appeal of this case, a motion was made to
disqualify the judge without cause. Arguments were held and briefs were written. The district
judge ruled it was not necessary for him to disqualify himself.
About a year later the district judge rendered a new decision which allegedly covered the
issues the Supreme Court said needed to be addressed. Prior to this decision the district comt
made no contact with counsel, nor were any requests for infonnation or even notice of what the
court was doing ever given.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed. The matter was argued and the
motion was denied. From the above facts this Appeal was taken.
ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Whether the District Court erred in not granting Defendant's motion to disqualify
without cause.

2. Whether the District Court erred in not properly addressing damages.
3. Whether the District Court erred in not properly finding the value of the land.
4. Whether the District Court erred in its determination of the amount of land damaged.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court's findings of fact in a court-tried case will be liberally construed on appeal in
favor of the judgment entered, in view of the district court's role as trier of fact. Western
Heritage Ins. Co. v. Green, 137 Idaho 832, 835, 54 P.3d 948, 951 (2002) (citing Conley v.
Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 269, 985 P.2d 1127 (1999); Lindgren v. Martin, 130 Idaho 854, 857,
949 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1997)). Review of the decision is limited to ascertaining whether the
evidence supp01ts the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of
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law. Id.

If the findings of fact are based on substantial evidence, even if the evidence is

conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal. Id. However, this Court exercises free review
over questions of law. Id.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Attorney fees may be awarded on appeal under I.A.R.41 and LC. §12-121. Attorney fees
should be awarded to the Appellant because the appeal brought out all the legal mistakes in the
law made by the district judge. Because of the above Appellant should be deemed the prevailing
party on Appeal. Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406,659 P.2d 160 (Ct.App.1983).
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
A. FAILURE TO DISQUALIFY WITHOUT CAUSE

On January 3, 2007, the Defendant timely filed a Motion to disqualify the district judge who
originally tried this case. (C.R.P. p.3)

On May 30, 2007, the district judge issued a

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY. (C.R. P. p.19-22) Basically the district court stated it did not need to disqualify
itself because of its interpretation of the case of Liebelt v. Liebelt, 125 Idaho 302 (Ct.App. 1994)
and judicial economy. (C.R.P. p.20) These two issues will next be examined to see if they are
valid.
The district court stated Plaintiffs objection to the motion to disqualify was well taken
because the Liebelt case was "authority to deny the motion because the case was not remanded
for a new trial, merely for additional finding of fact. This court agrees, and therefore denies the
motion". (C.R.P. p.20) The distdct court went on to say "The Idaho Court of Appeals reached
the same conclusion in Liebelt. There, the Court held the rule did not apply when a case was
remanded for additional findings of fact, 125 Idaho at 305. The Court of Appeals held that it is
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not a "new trial" for operation of the rnle. This case was also remanded for additional finding of
fact, not for a new trial. In that regard this case and Liebelt are very similar, and similar results
should obtain. The court will not grant the motion to disqualify." (C.R.P. p. 20)
The Supreme Court stated this case was remanded for "further proceedings consistent with
this opinion". Ransom v. Topaz, 143 Idaho 641, 647 (2006). The Supreme Court also stated "the
case must be remanded back to tbe district court for further findings of fact." Id. at 645. The
district court conducted no further findings of fact.
The district court erred by misinterpreting I.R.C.P. Rule 40(d)(l). The basic premise of the
rule is set forth under Rule 40( d)(l )(A). It states "any party may disqualify one (I) judge by
filing a motion for disqualification, which shall not require the stating of any grounds therefore,
and such motion for disqualification, if timely, shall be granted." The rule then goes on to tell
what one must do in various circumstances, i.e. what is the time limit to file, when there are
multiple parties, or new parties, or a new judge, or a new trial, or an alternate judge or how to
serve

a

judge

the

notice

and

finally

the

exceptions

to

the

rule.

(Rule

40(d)())(B)(C)(D)(E)(F)(G)(H)(I)) Rule 40(d)(l)(F) simply states what one does when a new
trial is ordered, nothing more. It certainly does not say if the Supreme Court remands a matter
back to the trial judge the trial judge cannot be disqualified. The rule simply states how to
disqualify the Judge if a new trial is ordered in the remand by the Supreme Court. The basic
premise of the rule still applies, i.e. one may disqualify a judge without cause. "the purpose of
the rule permitting disqualification of a judge without cause is "to insure a fair tribunal by
allowing a party to disqualify a judge thought to be unfair or biased."" (In the matter of the
application of: Herb Arthur dba Herb's Towing, Herb Arthur v. Shoshone County, 33 Idaho 854,
857(App.) citing Jahnke v. Moore, 112 Idaho 944, 946 (Ct.App.1987).
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The district court also misinterpreted the Liebelt case. This misinterpretation probably arose
from the following language found in Liebelt: "However, we did not remand the case for a "new
trial". As our opinion makes clear, we remanded the case for the limited purpose of having the
magistrate make additional written findings on particular issues of fact which had already been
tried before him. Accordingly, Rule 40(d)(l)(F) did not apply to grant Kenneth an automatic
right to disqualify the magistrate without cause". The above language is somewhat ambiguous.
No new trial was ordered so obviously Rule 40(d)(l)(f) is not applicable. However the language
does imply since the Supreme Court did not order a new trial and only ordered written findings
of fact one cannot be granted, even if timely request is made, a disqualification of the trial judge.
To follow this interpretation is absolutely contrary to Rule 40( d)(l )(A) and the purposes of the
rule found in the above cited cases of Arthur and Jahnke.
The motion to disqualify was also denied in the Liebelt case because it was not timely filed.
The district court also denied the motion to disqualify on the grounds of judicial economy.
Neither the Rules nor the cases speak of judicial economy. They speak of judicial fairness. The
day judicial fairness gives way to judicial economy will be a sad day indeed.
B. DAMAGES

In the Supreme Court's opinion it remanded the case because the district court "improperly
measured actual damages for Lower's trespass." Ransom v. Topaz, 143 Idaho 641, 647 (2006).
The Supreme Court stated there were two separate matters the district court did wrong and thus
must conduct "further proceedings consistent with this opinion" to complete the matter. Id. at
647. Those two matters are as follows: (1) The district court "failed to distinguish between
damages attributable to Lower's permissible trespass to create or maintain an access road and
damages attributable to excessive intrusion exceeding the scope of the easement" and, (2) to
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distinguish "between costs to repair temporary damage and an award of damages for permanent
damage to the property". Id. at 647. Unf01iunately the district court erred when it attempted to
measure the actual damages and those errors shall next be considered.
In regards to the first matter set forth above, the district court ruled there were a number of
damages which did arise from the modifications of the easement.

Those include erosion,

sloughing caused by cuts made on Plaintiffs land out side the easement, removal and deposit of
soil on Plaintiffs land, failure to install culve1is, and mitigate the altered and increased flow of
water onto Plaintiffs land outside the easement. As a result of the above the district court gave
two examples of the injury caused, i.e. "50% of precipitation does not percolate into the newly
graveled area and thus causes erosion and water intrusion onto Plaintiffs land and the sloughing
caused by the increase of water has rendered the land useless for building aud cultivating".
(C.R.A. p.24, last paragraph)
The main issue relating to these findings is the question of whether they are supported by any
facts. Before going into these issues it is import for this Court to look at the Clerk's Record on
Appeal.

It will reveal the only thing heard by the district court prior to its Memorandum

Decision & Order filed on 12-5-07 were matters relating to Appellant's Motion to Disqualify.
No new evidence was requested by the district court nor was auy hearing held concerning what
need be done because of the remand. The probable reasons for this are set out in the district
court's Memorandum Decision aud Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Disqualify. (C.R.A.
p.19-21) In this decision the district court stated "The decision of the Idaho Supreme Court does
not order a new trial. It remands the case back to this Court for additional findings of fact on the
measure of damages for trespass. This Court has previously heard the evidence in this case and
made the findings which are to be supplemented. This Comi is in the best position to make those
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additional findings". (C.R.P. p. 20) From these statements it is apparent the Court did not want,
and thought it did not need, any more hearings or evidence. This would seem to mean only
evidence given in the original trial can be relied on by the district court to reach its facts and
conclusions.
Having set forth the district court's distinction between damages done in the permissible
trespass and those done by the impermissible trespass, the Court then moved to the second matter
requested by the Supreme Court. This issue broadly distinguishes between cost of temporary
damages and permanent damages.
The district court found the Plaintiff did not prove any permanent or temporary damages.
(C.R.W. p.27, line 3) The Court then went on to say under the authority of Nampa & Meridian
Irrigation Dist. No.131, 139 Idaho 28 (2003), since the value of the land had been proven the

Court could award damages. The Court awarded $26,600.00 for damages. (C.R.W. p.27, 2d
paragraph) This sum was determined by finding "approximately 7 acres were injured and the
land is valued at $3,800 per acre for a total value of $26,600.00". (C.R.W. p.26, last full
sentence) This ruling by the district court creates the issue as to whether a court can assess
damages if none were proven by the Plaintiff. The district court says it can assess damages even
if Plaintiff did not prove any damages under the authority found in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation
Dist. No.131. Id.

In its first statement under ANALYSIS the Supreme Court stated the general rule that "a trial
court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous". Nampa

& Meridian Irrigation Dist. No.131. Id at 32. The district court found Plaintiff had not proven
any permanent or temporary damages. It is assumed these finding of fact would not be set aside.
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However, the district court later went on to say that while no permanent damages were
proven the Court was going to award temporary damages, saying the cost to restore the land to
it's pre-injury state was more than the land's value so the Court would reduce the award "to the
estimated value, that being $26,000.00". (C.R.W. p.27-28, under the Comi's Order) The comi in
the Nampa Case does not say if no damages were proven by the Plaintiff the trial court can,
without proof, assess damages.

In the Nampa case, after reviewing the measure of damages to land which was permanently
injured or temporarily injured, the Supreme Court went on to say "the rule precluding recovery
of restoration costs in excess of the diminution in value is not of invariable application". Id. at
34. Assuming any of this is relevant, which this writer believes it is not because of the prior

ruling of the district court, what is the meaning of the words "diminution in value is not of
invariable application"? The Supreme Court cited authority from which the meaning is derived.
The Orndorff Case stated "Restoration costs may be awarded even though they exceed the
decrease in market value if there is a reason personal to the owner for restoring the original
condition or where there is reason to believe that the parties will, in fact, make the repairs".
Orndorff v. Christian County Builders, 217 Cal.App.3d 683, 266 Cal.Rptr. 193, 195

(Ct.App.1990). The County of Weld Case explained this doctrine to greater length. "Market
value before and after the injury is ordinarily a rule applied to measure damages to real property.
Since the goal of the law of compensatory damages is reimbursement of the plaintiff for the
actual loss suffered, there may, of course, be instances in which repair or restoration costs may
be a more appropriate measure such as (1) where the property has no market value, (2) where
repairs have already been made, or (3) where the property is a recently acquired private residence
and the plaintiffs interest is in having the property restored, repair costs will more effectively
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return him to the position he was in prior to the injury". (The Board of County Commissioners of
the County of Weld, State of Colorado v. John P. Slovek, Sr., John P. Slovek, Jr., Gary W Slovelc
and Michael S. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1314 (Colo.1986)

None of the above applies to this case. The Plaintiffs' bought the land "with the intent of
building some summer cabins up there for us as the members of the group and possibly over on
this particular area that we are talking about, selling this area and some of the frontage ground.
We wanted to be back more over the hill, back into the background and so we were ·
contemplating using this as a way to recap part of our investment. As .has been stated, there is
some very good ground there. There is also a hill that sluffs. The ground that is very good is
back up against the trees." (R.T. day 3 of trial, testimony of Mr. Earnest Robert Rauzi, p. 166,
L.7-13) No cabins were built and no land was sold prior to the trial. As stated, the good land
was up against the trees. This was not land involved in the litigation. The land in litigation was
below the hill that sluffs. During the first appeal of this case all of the Plaintiffs' land was sold.
This land bought by the Plaintiffs' was investment land bought with ma.inly the idea of making
more money. The potential abuse of this measure of damages was set out in the County of Weld
case where it was stated "obviously, to the extent that a property owner is allowed to recover
costs of restoration that are greater than the diminution in market value, there is the possibility
that the owner will receive a monetary windfall by choosing not to restore the property and by
selling it instead, profiting to the extent that restoration costs recovered exceed the diminution of
market value". (County of Weld, Id. p.1317) In its motion for reconsideration the district comi
was requested to have the Plaintiff disclose the amount received from the sale of the land.
(C.R.A. p.35) The district court denied the request. (C.R.A. p. 39) It is for these reasons the
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principles involving restoration costs are not applicable and these cases and their rulings
certainly do not allow a trial court to award damages which have not been proven.
Even though the district court stated the Plaintiff had not proven any pennanent or temporary
damages it went ahead and awarded $26,600 in damages to Plaintiff. As pointed out earlier it
did this by saying the land was worth $3,800.00 per acre and multiplying it by 7, the alleged
number of acres damages. These findings are not only contradictory to the Courts own findings
but are also an abuse of the Court's discretion. In the three part test to detennine an abuse of
discretion the district court failed to meet the second part of the test. See Bybee v. Isaac, 1788
P.3d 606, 145 Idaho 251 (2008). In this regard the district court did not act within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it. More examples of this abuse are contained in the following topics
marked C and D.
C. VALUE OF LAND
There was no testimony the land had a value of$3,800.00 per acre. This figure was stated by
Bob Rauzi.

He said the land had been owned since 1983, it had been up for sale for

approximately 5 years, no one had put any earnest money on the land and its asking price was
$3,800.00 per acre. (Tr. 7/21/04, p.168-169) Mr. Rauzi also testified, as owner of the land, he
thought the land was worth $10,000.00 to $50,000.00 an acre. (Tr. 7/21/04, p.167) He based his
values of the Franklin County property on property located in Island Parle (Tr. 7/21/04, p. 166)

It should also be noted in the original decision of this case by the Supreme Court, the Court also
erred by stating "while there is some indication in the record that the property was about ten
acres in size and was valued at approximately $3,800 per acre the judge made no determination
about how much property was actually damaged or what the value of the property was".
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(Ransom v. Topaz, 143 Idaho 643, 645.) While this hint of the amount and value of the land is
interesting, it is not based on any facts. This may also be a reason the district court erroneously
placed a value of $3,800.00 per acre on the land. The law must be kept in mind. "Generally, the
Plaintiff in a trespass action has the burden to prove a causal connection between the
Defendant's. alleged wrongful conduct and the Plaintiffs injury, as well as the extent of the
injury sustained." Nelson v. Holdaway Land and Cattle Co., 107 Idaho 550, 552, 691 P.2d. 796
(Ct.App.1984). "Damages, and the amount thereof, must be proven to a reasonable certainty."

Wingv. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912,919 (Ct.App.1984)
The defendant, Mr. Lower, offered to purchase 20 acres of the land owned by Farr West
situated near his easement for $650.00 per acre. (Tr.7/21/04, p.116)
Mr. Allen E. Burris, who was qualified as an expert in land appraisals, testified the Farr West
land had a value of $600.00 per acre, and he provided a written appraisal to support his opinion.
(Tr. 4/27/05, p.140-141) and (exhibit QQ)
No other testimony was presented as to land values. All of these land values were based on
pre-trespass values. No values were testified to as to pre-trespass and post-trespass. Presumably
that is why the district court found no damages had been proven.
The district court breached its discretion when it awarded damages based on the asking sale
price at the time of trial. Certainly asking price has nothing to do with fair market value of land.
One of the reasons for remand of the first appeal of this case was "the court failed to detennine
the fair market value of the land". (Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P. 143 Idaho 641, 645) The
only real evidence given as to the fair market value of the land was given by the appraiser, Mr.
Burris, who testified the land had a value. of $600.00 per acre. This is the value the court should
have placed on the land prior to the trespass. There was no testimony as to market value after the
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trespass. Thus the court had no evidence of any decrease in market value of the land and could
not then compare any decrease in land value with restoration costs.
D. AMOUNT OF LAND DAMAGED

There was no proof seven acres of the land were damaged. The only evidence of the amount
of land damaged was given by Thomas Kass Biggs. His testimony was based on a picture he
was looking at and went as follows:

Q. Okay. And how many acres does that involve, do you know?
A. I would approximate maybe 6, 7 acres. I am not good with land.

Q. IfI were to represent to you that this whole thing from here to here, around where the
trees are and down here is approximately 7 acres?
A. Okay.

Q: Then you are talking about maybe a fourth of it at the most?
A. Yeah. I would say so. Maybe a third

Mr. Biggs' testimony implies there was damage to land, i.e. he intended to repair, one-fourth
of seven acres, or 1.75 acres. This is the only evidence of the amount of land damaged. The
district court could, in its discretion, adopt this finding. The district comi did abuse its discretion
by saying a total of seven acres was damaged.
CONCLUSION

The district court improperly handled the remand heretofore ordered by the Supreme Court.
The first error was in denying the motion to disqualify without cause. If the motion had been
granted and a new judge appointed to hear the case the odds are the case would have been
resolved and no appeal filed.
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The Supreme Court asked the district comi to do two things. The district court tried to do
these two things but ended up in a quagmire.

It found the Plaintiff had not proven any

pennanent or temporary damages. Then the court reversed itself and assessed damages using the
wrong amount of land damaged and incompetent evidence supporting the court's value of the
land before the trespass. There was no evidence of the lands decrease in value after the trespass.
It is requested the district court's decision be partially set aside and the case dismissed with
prejudice because there was no proof of any perrnanent or temporary damages. In the alternative
this court could remand the case with an order to award damages by valuing the land at $600.00
per acre and multiplying this by 1.75 acres for the sum of $1,050.00. This would be more cost
effective for all the parties than a remand to detem1ine the exact damages.
Dated this 15 th day of January, 2009.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of January, 2009, in accordance with the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure and Appellant Rules, I mailed two true and con-ect copies of the foregoing
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F. Randall Kline
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